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In April this year something very strange happened 
in Washington. A few months earlier, the U.S. Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, the most prestigious 
science body in the land, published a report that 
concluded: 
“A strong, credible body of scientific evidence 
shows that climate change is occurring, is caused 
largely by human activities, and poses significant 
risks for a broad range of human and natural sys-
tems.” 
Then in April the following resolution was put to the 
House of Representatives: 
“Congress accepts the scientific findings … that 
climate change is occurring, is caused largely by 
human activities, and poses significant risks for 
public health and welfare.” 
The House voted to reject the proposition by 240-
184.2 The United States is the nation whose scien-
tific achievements dominated the 20th century. Yet 
the US Congress now believes it can vote down the 
laws of atmospheric physics. What has happened? 
In the minds of US conservatives, climate science—
in which some of the best scientists in the world 
investigate a matter of the gravest public concern—
has come to represent the enemy. Why? 
Climate science has become enmeshed in the bitter 
culture war that has divided US society. A backlash 
against the achievements of the progressive 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s, the culture war 
has focussed on questions of gender, sexuality, 
ethnic diversity and “traditional values”. 
Environmentalism was identified early as a political 
threat by conservatives because it challenged set-
tled assumptions about “man and nature” and criti-
cised the power of big business. So conservatives 
attacked what they saw as “environmental extrem-
ists”, along with “radical feminists”, “militant homo-
sexuals”, “multiculturalism” and “secular liberals”. At 
its core, the culture war is about which values and 
behaviours should be common and which differ-
ences should be tolerated or encouraged.  
Environmentalism was drawn into the culture war 
because it was seen to destabilize the ideas of pro-
gress and mastery of nature, which are traditionally 
understood as the basis of civilisation and “the 
American way of life”. However, anti-
environmentalism did not gain traction among the 
wider public until the early 2000s when—after sus-
tained efforts by conservative activists often backed 
by fossil fuel corporations over many years—
environmentalism began to be identified as one of 
the central elements of the new surge of right-wing 
populism.  
In the last decade there has opened up a deep di-
vide between liberal and conservative voters in their 
beliefs about global warming. The opening of this 
gulf was not an accident but part of a deliberate 
strategy to cast doubt on the science of climate 
change. From the mid-1990s Republican Party ac-
tivists, in collaboration with fossil fuel interests and 
conservative think tanks, successfully associated 
acceptance of global warming science with “liberal” 
views. This has now been thoroughly documented.3. 
Before this campaign the views of US citizens on 
global warming were influenced mostly by their 
attentiveness to the science; now one can make a 
good guess at an American’s opinion on global 
warming by identifying their views on abortion, 
same-sex marriage and gun-control.  
Surveys show that among those who dismiss cli-
mate science, 76 per cent describe themselves as 
“conservative” and only three per cent as “liberal” 
(with the rest “moderate”). Those who reject climate 
science also overwhelmingly oppose income redis-
tribution policies, programs to reduce poverty and 
regulation of business. They prefer to watch Fox 
News and listen to right-wing “shock-jock” Rush 
Limbaugh. 
Climate deniers are disproportionately white, male, 
middle-aged and conservative— those who feel 
their cultural identity most threatened by the impli-
cations of climatechange.4  
Those on the left are perhaps as predisposed to sift 
evidence through ideological filters; but in the case 
of global warming it happens that the scientific evi-
dence overwhelmingly endorses the liberal beliefs 
that unrestrained capitalism is jeopardising future 
well-being, that comprehensive government inter-
vention is needed, and that the environment move-
ment was right all along. For neoconservatives ac-
cepting these is intolerable, and it is easier emo-
tionally and more convenient politically to reject 
climate science.  
This has culminated in the rise of the Tea Party, the 
movement of those who demand their fair share of 
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injustice. As has now been well-documented, the 
Tea Party did not emerge spontaneously from 
popular anger but was heavily funded by the 
KochBrothers5 (the billionaires who set out to use 
their wealth to bring about a conservative revolu-
tion) and heavily promoted by Rupert Murdoch’s 
Fox News.6  
The vote in April against science in the US Con-
gress reflected the influx of Republicans backed by 
the Tea Party movement at the mid-term elections. 
In a mentality reminiscent of the US major who in 
1968 said that American troops had to destroy the 
Vietnamese village in order to save it from com-
munism, Tea Party Republicans seem to have de-
cided they must destroy the Earth in order to save it 
from environmentalism.  
In Europe, the absence of a long-running and ran-
corous culture war explains the relative weakness 
of climate denial. Where it does prevail it is associ-
ated with parties of the far right. It seems perfectly 
natural, for example, that the British National Party 
should adopt a denialist stance and that the mani-
festo of Norwegian mass murderer Anders Behring 
Breivik should be full of climate science denial, in-
cluding praise for Christopher Monckton and dark 
warnings about the plot by environmentalists to use 
the UN to take over the world. 
In the mainstream press deniers are evident. For 
example, James Delingpole, a commentator for the 
Daily Telegraph in London, recently complained that 
Britain’s weather bureau, the Met Office, had be-
come part of “the eco-fascist takeover of theworld”.7 
Delingpole and his kin are not generally influential in 
Britain but they may provoke extremists. Delingpole 
lists some of those who are part of the eco-fascist 
conspiracy— the Prime Minister, various ministers, 
“all but five members of the last parliament”, the 
BBC, the Prince of Wales, almost every national 
newspaper, the European Union, the Royal Society, 
the New York Times, the Obama administration, 
and all schools and universities—before concluding 
“Truly there just aren’t enough bullets!”  
Science and power 
Climate scientists have unwittingly destabilising the 
political and social order; the results of their re-
search threaten the future of powerful industrialists 
and challenge comfortable expectations about un-
limited consumption growth. Climate science has 
discovered that our attempts to subdue and exploit 
the Earth are now turning back on us and threaten 
our future in profound ways, just as environmental-
ists have been arguing for four decades.  
We have arrived at one of those rare historical frac-
ture points when knowledge diverges from power, 
portending a long period of struggle before the two 
are once more aligned. Regrettably, the Earth is not 
going to put climate change on hold while we work it 
out; the carbon emissions we put into the atmos-
phere while the struggle goes on will still be chang-
ing the climate in a thousand years time.  
It is because climate scientists, diligently going 
about their work, have generated knowledge that 
challenges power that they have become the target 
of a campaign of vilification and intimidation. Some 
of the world’s most distinguished climate scientists 
have become the subjects of a new form of cyber-
bullying aimed at driving them out of the public do-
main. Each time they enter the public debate 
through a newspaper article or radio interview they 
are immediately subjected to a torrent of aggres-
sive, abusive and, at times, threatening emails.  
For example, Dr. Kevin Trenberth, head of analysis 
at the National Center for Atmospheric Research in 
Colorado, turned over to university security 19 pag-
es of “extremely foul, nasty, [and] abusive” mails 
collected in the four months after the Climategate 
storm broke in November 2009. Another prominent 
climate scientist had dead animal dumped on his 
doorstep and now travels with body-guards.  
Stephen Schneider, an eminent climatologist at 
Stanford University who died a few months ago, 
said last year that he had received hundreds of 
threatening emails. 
Exasperated he asked: “What do I do? Learn to 
shoot a magnum? Wear a bullet-proof jacket?” He 
believed that a scientist would be killed. Schneider 
said he had observed an “immediate, noticeable 
rise” in emails whenever climate scientists were 
attacked by prominent right-wing US ommentators. 
Climate deniers have successfully used the instru-
ments of democratic practice to erode the authority 
of professional expertise. Techniques have included 
skilful use ofa free media, exploitation of freedom-
of-information laws, mobilisation of a group of vocif-
erous citizens, and promotion of their own to public 
office. At least in the UnitedStates and Australia, 
democracy has defeated science.  
The campaign of harassment against scientists took 
a sinister turn last year when Oklahoma Republican 
Senator James Inhofe called for some of the world’s 
most eminent climate scientists to be investigated 
for criminal violations. A document prepared by his 
staff on the US Senate Committee on Environment 
and Public Works claims scientists mentioned in 
emails stolen from the Climatic Research Unit 
(CRU) at the University of East Anglia are guilty of 
manipulating data and obstructing its release. It lists 
federal laws they may have violated and names 17 
climate scientists whom Inhofe claims should be 
investigated for possible criminal prosecution.  
One of those listed, Raymond Bradley, the director 
of climate science research at the University of 
Massachusetts Amherst, responded: “I am worried 
about it, I have to say. You can understand that this 
powerful person is using the power of his office to 
intimidate people and to harass people and you 
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wonder whether you should have legal counsel. It is 
a very intimidating thing and that is the point.”  
According to Scientific American, deniers in Con-
gress have used their offices to send “intimidating 
letters” threatening dire consequences to scientists 
working on climate change. One of the recipients, 
NASA scientist Gavin Schmidt, said: “That is chilling 
the work of science in the agencies. It’s certainly 
very off-putting for scientists who want to talk about 
their stuff in public but fear the political conse-
quences. Nobody wants to create an enemy on the 
hill.”  
In an editorial last March on cyber-bullying, Nature 
reported on Senator Inhofe’s attempts to criminalise 
climate scientists before commenting: “As a mem-
ber of the minority party, Inhofe is powerless for 
now, but that may one day change.” That day came 
last November with the mid-term elections in which 
the Republicans, powered by a surge of support for 
the Tea Party, won a majority in the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
A series of inquiries has exonerated the scientists 
whose emails were stolen from the University of 
East Anglia, and affirmed that there is nothing in 
them to undermine the science. If you read them, 
what the hacked UEA emails revealed is the enor-
mous external pressure climate scientists work un-
der. They show they have constantly been accused 
of being frauds and cheats; their work has been 
twisted and misrepresented; and they have been 
bombarded with vexatious freedom-of-information 
requests orchestrated by denialists.  
Wishful thinking 
In its active form climate denial has been restricted 
to small minorities. But their influence spread far 
and wide. Although most members of the public 
superficially accept the scientific consensus, by 
sowing doubt climate deniers provide a reason to 
accept it with less conviction. Doubts sown by deni-
ers reinforce the psychological mechanisms we all 
deploy to avoid the unpleasant feelings triggered by 
exposure to the warnings of climate scientists.  
So instead of repudiating the science outright, we 
admit some of the facts, and allow some of the as-
sociated emotions, but do so in distorted form. For 
example, it is common to hear people reinterpreting 
the threat by using narratives such as “people have 
solved these sorts of problems before”, “if it were 
that bad the government would be doing something 
about it” and “scientists are probably exaggerating”. 
The eaked “Climategate” emails were a coup for 
climate deniers around the world because they 
seemed to reinforce exactly these sorts of excuses. 
Some people derive a peculiar sort of pleasure in 
describing themselves as “an optimist”. It’s a kind of 
one-upmanship used to shut down those arguing 
that the evidence shows the future is not rosy. 
“Whatever you might say, I am an optimist”, they 
intone, implying that their interlocutor is somehow 
not bold enough to take on the challenge. It’s not so 
much passive aggression as a sunny aggression 
firmly rooted in the moral superiority of cheerful-
ness. This is a modern predilection exposed by 
Barbara Ehrenreich in her powerful book Smile or 
Die: How Positive Thinking Fooled America and the 
World. If positive thinking can defeat breast cancer, 
why can’t it defeat climate change?  
The power of wishful thinking can be seen in some 
of history’s great acts of unpreparedness. In 1933 
Winston Churchill began warning of the belligerent 
intentions of Hitler’s Germany and the threat they 
posed to world peace. In many speeches through 
the 1930s he devoted himself to alerting Britons to 
the dangerous currents running through Europe, 
returning over and over to the martial nature of the 
Nazi regime, the rapid re-arming of Germany, and 
Britain’s lack of reparedness for hostilities.  
Yet pacifist sentiment among the British public, still 
traumatized by the memory of the Great War, pro-
vided a white noise of wishful thinking that muffled 
the warnings. 
Behind the unwillingness to re-arm and resist ag-
gression lay the gulf between the future Britons 
hoped for—one of peace—and the future the evi-
dence indicated was approaching—war in Europe; 
just as today behind the unwillingness to cut green-
house gas emissions lies the gulf between the fu-
ture we hope for—continued stability and prosperi-
ty—and the future the evidence tells us is approach-
ing—one of danger and sacrifice.  
The warnings of Churchill and a handful of others 
were met with derision. In terms akin to those now 
used to ridicule individuals warning of climate disas-
ter—“fearmongers”, “doom-sayers”, “alarmists”—he 
was repeatedly accused of exaggerating the dan-
ger, of irresponsibility, of using “the language of 
blind and causeless panic” and of behaving like “a 
Malay running amok”.  
Late in 1938, Churchill’s trenchant criticism of 
Chamberlain’s Munich agreement— he called it “a 
total and unmitigated defeat”—earned him the fury 
of Conservative party members. Anti-Churchill forc-
es in the party rallied and as late as March 1939— 
months before war was declared and a year before 
he was to become war-time Prime Minister—it 
seemed likely Churchill would be ousted as a Con-
servative MP by Government loyalists.  
Benign fictions 
Although we generally think of a willingness to face 
up to reality as a sign of mental health, a strong 
case can be made that the normal human mind 
interprets events in ways that promote “benign fic-
tions” about oneself, the world and the future.
8 In-
deed, in some countries—particularly the United 
States—there is strong cultural pressure to adopt 
an optimistic outlook on life.  
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Cultivating these benign fictions can be a healthy 
response to an often unfriendly world in which one’s 
self-belief is constantly at risk of a battering, as 
many young people discover when they enter talent 
shows. It is well-established that holding a positive 
view of the future enhances mental health, and that 
chronic pessimism is associated with anxiety and 
depression.  
“Unrealistic optimism” is a proclivity that leads us to 
predict what we would prefer to see happen rather 
than what is objectively most likely. By giving us 
greater motivation, this can be beneficial. Yet within 
the phenomenon of unrealistic optimism it is vital to 
distinguish between illusion and delusion. Illusions 
respond and adapt to reality as it forces itself on us 
while delusions are held despite the evidence of the 
outside world. 
The evidence that large-scale climate change is 
unavoidable has now become so strong that healthy 
illusion is becoming unhealthy delusion. Hoping that 
a major disruption to the Earth’s climate can be 
avoided is a delusion. Optimism sustained against 
the facts, including unfounded beliefs in the power 
of consumer action or in technological rescue, risks 
turning hopes into fantasies.  
Camus’ The Plague 
Some further insights into modern aversion to fac-
ing up to climate science can be drawn from Albert 
Camus’ 1947 novel The Plague (La Peste), which is 
typically read as a representation of how the French 
responded to German occupation. Bubonic plague 
breaks out in Oran, a town of some 200,000 people 
in Algeria. It is cut off from the rest of the world for 
months on end as thousands succumb to horrible 
deaths. 
Dr. Bernard Rieux, the novel’s protagonist, is the 
first to recognise that the mass die off of rats and 
the strange symptoms of his patients signal the 
arrival of plague. It took others much longer to ac-
cept the facts before them. The citizens of Oran, 
wrote Camus, “did not believe in pestilence”. They 
told themselves “that it is unreal, that it is a bad 
dream that will end”.  
In a comment that applies with great force to the 
contemporary climate debate, Camus observed that 
in denying the facts “we continue to give priority to 
our personal feelings”. As the story unfolds, Camus 
sees into the strategies used by the townspeople to 
deny or avoid the meaning of the plague. First they 
tell themselves the deaths are due to something 
else. Then they tell each other the epidemic will be 
hortlived and life will soon return to normal. Later, 
they cling to superstitions and prophecies, unearth-
ing old texts that seem to promise deliverance or 
protection. They begin to drink more wine because 
a rumour has circulated that wine kills the plague 
bacillus. Then, when drunk, they offer optimistic 
opinions into the night air.  
After months of the deadly epidemic everyone con-
fined in Oran fears it will never end. There is Jean 
Tarrou, a mysterious visitor trapped in the quaran-
tined town, who kept a chronicle of events in which 
the people of Oran were viewed from a distance, as 
through the wrong end of a telescope. Wrote Ca-
mus: 
Yes, there was an element of abstraction and unre-
ality in misfortune. But when an abstraction starts to 
kill you, you have to get to work on it.  
As a means of abstracting from suffering, Tarrou’s 
telescope is akin to the approach of some scien-
tists, like James Lovelock, who take up a position 
somewhere in space from which they dispassion-
ately analyse the possible end of humanity in an 
abstract kind of way. 
Those who are willing to face up to the meaning of 
the climate crisis can learn something of how to 
approach such a depressing situation from Camus’ 
hero. Dr. Rieux works tirelessly against overwhelm-
ing odds. He knows that any victories against the 
plague will be short-lived. “But that is not a reason 
to give up the struggle”, he tells his friend; “… one 
must fight, in one way or another, and not go down 
on one’s knees”, an attitude sometimes read as a 
metaphor used by Camus for the stance of the 
French Resistance against German occupation. 
Camus argued that the only way to maintain one’s 
integrity in such a situation is to adopt what he 
called an “active fatalism”, in which “one should 
start to move forward, in the dark, feeling one’s way 
and trying to do good.” Rieux’s active fatalism is 
similar to the distinction, drawn by Nietzsche, be-
tween the pessimism of strength and the pessimism 
of weakness. Pessimism as strength faces up to the 
facts as they present themselves, accepts the dan-
ger fully, and engages in sober analysis of what is. 
It is the pessimism of Dr. Rieux, in contrast to that 
of other citizens of Oran who succumbed to de-
spondency, adopted a submissive stance and ca-
pitulated to the situation through a weary knowing-
ness.  
The End of Humanism 
So far I have considered evasion and denial as 
political, social and psychological processes. But I 
wonder whether matters go deeper, beyond under-
standing them as mere human weakness or distort-
ed expression of political objectives. I want to sug-
gest that climate denial in both its active and pas-
sive forms is a means of attempting to resolve a 
contradiction deep within the modern understanding 
of the world itself and our role in it.  
The central fact of climate science, barely grasped 
by the public, is that extra carbon dioxide persists in 
the atmosphere for many centuries. So what we do 
in the next one or two decades (in addition to emis-
sions from the past) will seal the fate of the Earth’s 
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climate for more than a thousand years, irrevocably 
transforming the world in ways less amenable to 
life. For two decades knowledge of the damage we 
are doing has been readily available yet we have 
not changed our ways. 
This fact drives a dagger into the heart of the mod-
ern understanding of the human being, that of 
world-maker, the Enlightenment subject who cre-
ates the future of the world. The idea of humans as 
world-makers has recently reached its full expres-
sion in the definition of a new geological epoch. The 
Anthropocene, which began a few decades ago, is 
defined by the fact that the “human imprint on the 
global environment has now become so large and 
active that it rivals some of the great forces of Na-
ture in its impact on the functioning of the Earth 
system”.
9  
Climate hange in the Anthropocene shows us to be 
enormously powerful yet, like the Sorcerer’s Ap-
prentice, unable to control our power,destabilising 
our self-understanding as autonomous subjects 
imposing ourselves on the natural environment. 
Climate disruption threatens to destroy the deepest 
idea of modernity— that we create the world, shape 
our future, and determine our own destiny.  
So the evidence of human-induced climate change 
destabilises the Enlightenment edifice of humanism, 
the elevation of human concerns and human reason 
to primacy and the banishment of other sources of 
authority. We are learning again what the ancients 
knew, that the human can never be extracted from 
its physical environment and that a fractious Earth 
can intercede at any moment.  
In repudiating all higher authorities—tradition, myth, 
god— humanism forgot that there may be “lower 
authorities” that needed appeasing, the gods of the 
underworld, so to speak. As the “slumbering beast” 
of nature stirs, the idols of the modern world— free 
will, reason, choice, technology, and unbounded 
optimism—seem to be losing their potency.  
But we cannot see this. Instead we search around 
for a technological means of conquering the situa-
tion, just as we have for 300 years. Grand techno-
logical schemes—such as for carbon capture and 
storage and climate engineering plans to spray 
sulphate aerosols into the upper atmosphere to 
reflect more sunlight—can be seen as attempts to 
reassert our mastery over an increasingly uncoop-
erative natural world.  
If this is so then coming to grips with climate change 
is not merely a question of changing our inds, for 
we can easily change our minds led house rejects 
science.
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